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TOO BIG TO MANAGE: A CASE FOR STRICTER 
BANK MERGER REGULATION 
Peter Lim Felton* 
“We have a new kind of bank.  It is called too big to fail.1  
TBTF, and it is a wonderful bank.” 
 - Congressman Stewart McKinney2 
“It is well enough that people of the nation do not 
understand our banking and money system, for if they did, 
I believe there would be a revolution before tomorrow 
morning.” 
- Henry Ford3 
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 1. See infra Part II.A. 
 2. GARY H. STERN & RON J. FELDMAN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE HAZARDS OF 
BANK BAILOUTS 13 (2d ed. 2004). 
 3. The Victims of Culture Enslaved by the International Banking 
Establishment, MEN’S WEEKLY, http://www.mensweekly.co.uk/finance/the-
victims-of-culture-enslaved-by-the-international-banking-establishment/ (last 
visited Apr. 17, 2012). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Bank failure lies at the center of the Great Recession, 
which has shaken the financial strength of the United States.  
Worse, there is a growing public distrust of government 
motives.4  Disagreement with policymakers’ decisions has 
 
 4. See Beth Fouhy, Democrats See Minefield in Occupy Protests, BUSINESS 
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fueled much of the American public’s disapproval of the 
government, voiced most recently by the Tea Party and 
Occupy Movements.  Many argue that the federal 
government’s decision to bail out failing banks in 2008 during 
the Great Recession lies at the center of this public 
discontent.5  The government defended its action as the only 
feasible option because allowing the banks to fail would prove 
disastrous for America.6 
The government’s bailouts, however, should not be the 
focus of the public’s frustration and outrage.  The real culprits 
are the bank mergers that created mammoth banks causing 
the government to feel forced to save private banks with 
public money.  How were banks allowed to merge and reach 
such unmanageable sizes?  Should these mergers have even 
been allowed? 
This Comment seeks to address these questions and 
discuss the soundness of the government’s decision to 
sanction these mergers.  Part I commences with delving into 
America’s banking history by exploring the federal 
governments’ initial regulation of the banking system, the 
subsequent deregulation, and relevant banking statutes.7  
Part II provides an explanation of the first praised, and then 
denounced, concept of “Too Big to Fail” (TBTF)—which 
suggests that if banks were large enough, they would not 
fail.8  Part III conducts a crucial legal analysis of the mergers 
creating TBTF banks, evaluating their admissibility 
according to banking statutes and antitrust laws.9  Lastly, 
Part IV discusses and proposes necessary modifications to the 
current banking system in the hopes of preventing further 
creation of TBTF banks and provides a possible solution to 
America’s current dilemma.10 
 
 
WEEK (Nov. 17, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/ 
D9R2J30G0.htm; Russ Roberts, Occupy Wall Street and Washington’s History of 
Financial Bailouts: Why We Need More Capitalism, Not Less, FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
(Oct. 21, 2011), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136609/russ-
roberts/occupy-wall-street-and-washingtons-history-of-financial-bailouts. 
 5. Fouhy, supra note 4; Roberts, supra note 4.  
 6. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM: 
REPORT ON TRANSACTIONS THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 2008 1 (2009). 
 7. See infra Part I. 
 8. See infra Part II. 
 9. See infra Part III. 
 10. See infra Part IV. 
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I. OVERVIEW OF BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES 
A. Useful Definitions 
Banks are invaluable to our society.  They provide both a 
location for people to (relatively) safely hold their money and 
a supply of money to persons or businesses.  A bank’s most 
basic function is to receive money from individuals and to 
then loan that money to other account holders.11  A more 
encompassing definition of banks defines them as “public 
[financial] institutions, for the custody and loan of money, the 
exchange and transmission of the same by means of bills and 
drafts, and the issuance of [their] own promissory notes, 
payable to bearer, as currency, or for the exercise of one or 
more of these functions . . . regulated by the law.”12 
Two terms used in this Comment are commercial banks 
and investment banks.13  “[C]ommercial banks offer a full 
range of banking services, including demand accounts (i.e., 
checking accounts) for business and personal use, savings and 
time deposits, investment and loan services, trust department 
services, and the like.”14  Investment banks, on the other 
hand, are “financial intermediaries whose business consists 
in underwriting and distributing securities and acting as 
brokers and dealers in securities already distributed.”15  The 
distinction between these two types of banks is important 
because they receive dissimilar regulatory treatment.  
Commercial banking statutes are generally more stringent 
than investment banking.16 
B. Concept of Banking Regulation 
To better appreciate banking regulation, it is important 
to first understand why it is necessary.  It is essential for 
basically two reasons: 1) banks hold a large amount of money 
 
 11. See M.J. DEVINE & P.A. ERNEST, MICHIE ON BANKS AND BANKING 7 
(2011). 
 12. Id. at 7–8 (citations omitted). 
 13. MICHAEL P. MALLOY, THE REGULATION OF BANKING: CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR REGULATORS 41 
(Anderson Publishing Co. 1992). 
 14. Id.  
 15. Id. 
 16. See Implications of the ‘Volcker Rules’ for Financial Stability: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 45–
49 (2010) [hereinafter Volcker Rules] (statement of Simon Johnson). 
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that is not their own, and 2) banks are involved in the risky 
business of lending money to borrowers who may or may not 
pay the banks back.  By holding and lending out money, 
banks impact the economy enormously.  “[Banking’s] very 
nature . . . makes it peculiarly an object of legislative 
solicitude in order that depositors and stockholders may be 
protected.”17  Its business also strongly impacts public 
interest through its lending function, which has an innate 
level of risk not present in most other businesses.18  Banking 
is speculative and volatile in nature and opens the door for 
illegal and unscrupulous behavior.19 
The justice system is not “eager to intrude into the 
business practices” of banks, but banking regulation is 
necessary for public welfare.20  The following legal definition 
of a bank explains its status as a corporation and subordinate 
nature to the government: “A bank is wholly a creature of 
statute doing business by legislative grace, and the right to 
carry on a banking business through the agency of a 
corporation is a ‘franchise’ right dependent on a grant of 
corporate powers by the state.”21  Furthering the need for 
banking regulation is the function of a bank as a corporation 
whose aim is to make money for its shareholders.22  The 
Michigan Supreme Court in Dodge v. Ford Motor Company 
held that a corporation’s principal aim is to make money for 
its shareholders and the firm’s decision making should be 
catered to that end.23  Some banks will take huge “risks that 
pay when times are good”24 in order to increase stock prices 
and dividends for the satisfaction of their shareholders (and 
employees and directors).25  However risk-taking banks that 
fail may require bailouts when their investments do not 
succeed and those bailouts become a heavy cost and burden 
for taxpayers.26 
 
 
 17. DEVINE & ERNEST, supra note 11, at 18. 
 18. Id. at 7, 18. 
 19. See id. at 18. 
 20. Id. at 23. 
 21. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 165 (9th ed. 2009). 
 22. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). 
 23. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684. 
 24. Volcker Rules, supra note 16, at 46 (statement of Simon Johnson). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
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Scholars make two primary counterarguments against 
banking regulation.  First, it is posited that shareholders, 
directors, and employees who gain relatively large profits 
captured by risky investments will reinvest, boosting the 
American economy.27  However, with a real and growing 
international market providing an avenue for people to place 
money overseas, more profits will flow outside of the country 
rather than being reinvested domestically.28  The second, 
equally defunct, argument is that the economy’s cyclical 
nature will neutralize the banks’ losses and gains.  In reality, 
the majority of gains stay with the rich29 while the burden of 
losses—in the form of federal bank bailouts—is borne by all 
economic classes; forcing lower classes to bear the brunt of 
banks’ risky and failed decisions without reaping any of the 
profits. 
C. History of Banking Regulation and Deregulation 
Banking regulation became a priority concern for the 
federal government after the Great Depression in 1933.30  The 
government proceeded to pass multiple banking statutes, 
including one in the same year as the Glass-Seagull Act 
(GSA)31 discussed infra.32 
Following a strong start, banking regulation grew 
increasingly lenient over the decades.33  Banks were 
deregulated to allow growth through increased latitude.34  
The aims of banking deregulation were “efficiency and 
coherence in the regulation of [banks]”35 and materialized in 
three main areas of banking: 
(i) [T]he deregulation of products, including (e.g., deposit 
interest rates and securities activities of banks); 
 
 27. See id. at 46–47. 
 28. DEVINE & ERNEST, supra note 11, at 20. 
 29. Id.  
 30. MALLOY, supra note 13, at 111. 
 31. Banking Act of 1933, c. 89, § 1, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); MICHAEL P. MALLOY, CONCISE HORNBOOK 
SERIES:  PRINCIPLES OF BANK REGULATION 206 (2d ed. 2003). 
 32. See infra Part I.D.1. 
 33. See MALLOY, supra note 13, at 111. 
 34. See id.  Deregulation is a movement encompassing more than just 
banking and has affected all facets of the economy.  Randall S. Kroszner, The 
Motivations Behind Banking Reform, 24 REG. 36, 36 (2001). 
 35. MALLOY, supra note 13, at 111. 
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(ii) [D]eregulation of markets, allowing more freedom to 
banks to engage in banking on an interstate basis; and, 
(iii) [S]tructural deregulation, reforming the structure of 
bank regulation itself into a more coherent system.36 
This loosening of government control granted banks the 
necessary freedom to burgeon.37  Banking statute 
modifications spanning the past eighty years, following the 
above-stated aims, exhibited the continuous deregulation of 
the banking industry.  Five banking statutes are presented in 
the following section to portray the evolution of the history of 
banking history from regulation to deregulation.38 
D. Relevant Banking Statutes 
1. The Glass-Steagall Act (GSA) 
Congress passed the Glass-Steagall Act on June 16, 1933 
as the Banking Act of 1933 in response to the securities fraud 
and deception at the root of the Great Depression.39  The 
mandates of the GSA were two-fold.  They extricated the 
regulatory treatment of investment banks from commercial 
banks, and limited commercial bank activity in securities 
markets.40 
The United States Supreme Court’s reasoning in 
Investment Company Institute v. Camp describes the possible 
apprehension of a marriage still alive thirty-eight years after 
the GSA’s enactment.  Investment companies in Investment 
Company Institute argued for the freedom of national banks 
to operate mutual funds, in effect, granting them the power of 
investment banks.41  The Court, however, did not accord them 
such freedom.  The resulting close relationship between 
commercial and investment banks would violate the GSA and 
the Court feared potential repercussions.42  Since commercial 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. See id.  A subsequent analysis will employ parts of these statutes to 
evaluate TBTF bank mergers. 
 38. See infra Part I.D. 
 39. Id. at 207; Banking Act of 1933, c. 89, § 1, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
 40. Banking Act of 1933, c. 89, § 1, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); MALLOY, supra note 31, at 208. 
 41. Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 624–25 (1971). 
 42. Id. at 639. 
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banks hold public money, failure would have been ruinous.  
As a result, commercial banks were kept separate from 
institutions involved in more risky investments such as 
investment companies.43  The passage of the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Financial Modernization Act in 1999 later nullified the 
Court’s ruling. 
2. The Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA) 
The BHCA was passed on May 9, 1956 and required the 
Federal Reserve Board to approve the creation of bank 
holding companies (BHCs),44 A BHC is defined within the 
statute as “any company which has control over any bank or 
over any company that is or becomes a bank holding company 
by virtue of this chapter.”45  Congress also installed a vital 
prohibition creating an inherent limitation on bank size.  The 
BHCA prohibited banks established in different states from 
acquiring each other.46 
3. The Bank Merger Act (BMA) 
The BMA, effective May 13, 1960,47 “prohibit[ed] mergers, 
consolidations, and purchases of assets with assumption of 
liabilities, as between banks, unless . . . prior written 
approval of the appropriate federal bank regulatory agency 
ha[d] been obtained.”48  The BMA was not originally used to 
examine the anticompetitive nature of bank mergers;49 the 
government instead used section 7 of the Clayton Act to 
analyze the potential risk.  Section 7 stated, 
No person engaged in commerce . . . shall acquire . . . the 
whole or any part of . . . another person engaged also in 
commerce . . . where in any line of commerce or in . . . any 
section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may 
be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create 
 
 43. See id. at 637–38. 
 44. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, c. 240, § 1, 70 Stat. 133 (codified as 
amended in 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841–44, 1846–48, 1851–52 (1996)); Important 
Banking Legislation, FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/important/ 
index.html (last updated May 15, 2007) (citing CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MAJOR 
STATUTES AFFECTING FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND MARKETS (2004)). 
 45. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (2006). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Bank Merger Act of 1960, Pub. L. 86-463, 74 Stat. 129 (codified as 
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (2006)); MALLOY, supra note 31, at 133. 
 48. MALLOY, supra note 13, at 295 (citation omitted). 
 49. MALLOY, supra note 31, at 133. 
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a monopoly.50 
The BMA was later amended in 1966 to deal with bank 
merger antitrust analysis.51  In order to decide a bank 
merger’s legality, the following factors are weighed: 
(1) Monopolization.  The agency cannot approve a 
proposed transaction that would result in a monopoly, or 
that would be in furtherance of any combination or 
conspiracy to monopolize or to attempt to monopolize the 
business of banking in any part of the United States.52 
(2) Anticompetitiveness.  The agency cannot approve a 
proposed transaction the effect of which in any section of 
the country may be substantially to lessen competition, or 
to tend to create a monopoly, or that in any other manner 
would be in restraint of trade.53 
(3) Traditional Banking Factors.  The agency must take 
into consideration the financial and managerial resources 
and the future prospects of the existing and proposed 
institutions, and the convenience and needs of the 
community to be served.  In addition, the responsible 
agency must take into consideration in every case the 
effectiveness of any insured depository institution 
involved in the proposed merger in combating money 
laundering activities, including in overseas branches.54 
These factors are essential to deciding a bank merger’s 
authorization.  They are discussed infra to analyze the 
soundness of TBTF bank mergers.55 
4. The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching 
Efficiency Act (RNIA) 
The RNIA, passed by Congress on September 29, 1994, 
requires banks to hold no less than ninety percent of their 
 
 50. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006). 
 51. MALLOY, supra note 31, at 135. 
 52. Id. at 137; see 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5)(A) (2006). 
 53. Id.; see 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5)(B) (2006).  However unlike Philadelphia 
National Bank, the BMA “permits approval of such a transaction if the agency 
finds that its anticompetitive effects ‘are clearly outweighed in the public 
interest by the probable effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and 
needs of the community to be served.’ ”   MALLOY, supra note 31, at 138. 
 54. Id.; see 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5)(B) (2006). 
 55. For the three factors used to analyze TBTF bank mergers, see infra Part 
III.C.3. 
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total retail deposits.56  It was designed to ensure banks would 
have adequate reserves available for a sudden run on the 
bank.  “This cap was not related to antitrust concerns as ten 
percent of a national market is too low to imply pricing power.  
Rather this was a sensible macro-prudential preventive 
measure—do[] [not] put all your eggs in one basket.”57 
However, this law is ineffective and limited for two 
reasons: “(1) The growth of big banks was not fueled by retail 
deposits but rather by various forms of ‘wholesale’ financing, 
and (2) [t]he cap was not enforced by lax regulators, so that 
Bank of America, J.P. Morgan Chase, and Wells Fargo all 
received waivers in recent years.”58  With banks outgrowing 
the statute’s safeguards, and lenient enforcement impeding 
efficacy, the RNIA has become dated and unworkable. 
5. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization 
Act (GLBA) 
The GLBA, passed on November 12, 1999,59 played a 
central role in bank deregulation because it “repealed [GSA] 
prohibitions on affiliations between commercial and 
investment banking enterprises . . . .”60  It permitted banks to 
act as Financial Holding Companies, allowing them to 
“engage in activities, and acquire companies engaged in 
activities, that are ‘financial in nature’ or that are incidental 
to such activities.”61  This law opened the door for banks to 
 
 56. Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, 
Pub. L. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 
12, 31, 112 U.S.C.); Volcker Rules, supra note 16, at 46 (statement of Simon 
Johnson). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id.  Wholesale financing involves “[t]he sale of securities among broker-
dealers and large institutional investors.  Securities sold at wholesale go for 
slightly lower prices than those paid by individual investors.”  Wholesale, THE 
FREE DICTIONARY, http://financial-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/wholesale 
(last visited Apr. 17, 2012). 
 59. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12, 15 U.S.C.); MALLOY, supra note 
31, at 206–07. 
 60. Id. at 207. 
 61. Id. (citing 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843(k)(1) (1999)).  An FHC is defined as “[a] 
financial institution engaged in nonbanking activities that offers customers a 
wide range of financial services, including the opportunity to purchase 
insurance products and invest in securities.”  Financial Holding Company 
(FHC), INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/financial-holding-
company-FHC.asp#axzz1eYZy9AOv (last visited Apr. 17, 2012). 
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invest in home mortgages, which were problematic financial 
activities prominent in the Great Recession. 
E. Evolution of Banking 
Deregulation of banks, combined with overall market 
globalization, altered the nature of banking.  Commercial 
banks merged with investment companies and invested in 
capital markets, taking full advantage of their privileges.62  
Recognizing these changes is indispensible to understanding 
TBTF banks’ construct and emergence. 
1. Investment Companies as Bank Holding Companies 
Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, not BHCs until 
recently, generate profits from investments.63  Bestowing the 
BHC designation upon investment companies, such as 
Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, provides them with 
protection in the form of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation’s (FDIC) deposit insurance.  Credit extensions 
provided by the Federal Reserve Board are also made 
available to investment banks turned BHCs.64  In return, 
BHCs subject themselves to additional government 
regulation, including increased government oversight over 
capitalization.65 
2. Bank Involvement in Capital Market Funding 
The sizable amount of available assets in capital markets 
presents banks with a lucrative investment opportunity.  A 
capital market is “any market where a government or a 
company [in this case a bank] can raise money (capital) to 
fund their operations and long term investment[s].”66  Bond 
 
 62. Sewall Chan, U.S.: Financial Debate Renews Scrutiny on Banks’ Size, 
CORPWATCH (Apr. 20, 2010), http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=15567.  
 63. Volcker Rules, supra note 16, at 46 (statement of Simon Johnson) (“[A] 
bank such as Goldman Sachs now has full access to the Federal [Reserve’s] 
discount window (as a bank holding company)—yet also retains the ability to 
make risky investments of all kinds anywhere in the world (as it did when it 
was an investment bank, before September 2008).  In a very real sense, the US 
government is now backing the world’s largest speculative investment funds—
without any effective oversight mechanisms.”). 
 64. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Press Release, 
FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, (Sept. 22, 2008), http://www.federalreserve.gov/news 
events/press/bcreg/20080921a.htm. 
 65. See id. 
 66. Mike Moffatt, What Are Capital Markets?, ABOUT.COM,  
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and stock markets are the most widely known examples.67 
In Too Big to Fail: The Hazards of Bank Bailouts,68 
authors Gary Stern and Ron Feldman, posited the possible 
advantages of capital market funding: 
[G]reater reliance on capital markets could reduce an 
institution’s chance of failure.  Capital market funding can 
be cheaper and allow for more effective and diversified 
management of liquidity.  The more arenas in which a 
bank can raise funds, the more likely it can survive a 
cutoff from a single source.69 
Regardless of the ability to diversify funds and spread risks 
through capital markets, banks must be wary of the risk they 
present.  The risk lying in these markets is their inherent 
volatility.70  Capital market funding can “increase instability 
by quickening the pace of failure.”71  Capital market 
companies cause this “quickened pace” because they are 
“quicker than other sources to restrict the quantity of funds 
they provide banks.”72  The failure of the Continental Illinois 
National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago forewarns 
against relying too heavily on “extensive capital market 
funding.”73  
 Continental Illinois’ failure lives on in bank infamy.  Its 
failure was the biggest American bank failure to date in 
1984.74  At that time, it was the seventh largest bank in the 
nation with almost forty billion dollars in assets and over 
thirty billion dollars in deposits.75  A run on the bank forced 
 
http://economics.about.com/od/financialmarkets/f/capital_markets.htm (last 
visited Apr. 17, 2012). 
 67. Id. 
 68. STERN & FELDMAN, supra note 2. 
 69. Id. at 68. 
 70. See id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 69. 
 73. Id. 
 74. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., MANAGING THE CRISIS: THE FDIC AND RTC 
EXPERIENCE 545 (1998).  Washington Mutual’s failure in 2009, later eclipsed 
Continental Illinois’ failure.  Francine McKenna, What I Learned Working at the 
Original Too Big to Fail Bank, AMERICAN BANKER (Dec. 23, 2011, 10:38 AM), 
http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/Continental-Illinois-Too-Big-to-
Fail-1045154-1.html. 
 75.  FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 74, at 546; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE, GAO/GGD-97-96, STAFF STUDY: FINANCIAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT: FOUR 
FINANCIAL CRISES IN THE 1980S 36 (1997). 
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the FDIC to seize Continental Illinois Bank.76  During the 
bank’s bailout, the forbidding term—Too Big to Fail—was 
first used.77 
II. TOO BIG TO FAIL 
A. TBTF Banks 
Part I began with an exploration of United States’ 
banking history and its current state.  Part II will tackle the 
task at hand, TBTF banks.  These banks’ failures would be so 
disastrous the government could not afford to let them fail.78  
The dilemma presented by TBTF banks’ size initially went 
unnoticed by certain legislative members.  During the bailout 
of the Continental Illinois Bank, Congressman Stewart 
McKinney praised these huge banks: 
[W]e have a new kind of bank. And today there is  
another type [of bank] created.  We found it in the thrift 
institutions, and now we have given approval for a $1 
billion brokerage deal to the Financial Corporation of 
America.  Mr. Chairman, let us not bandy words.  We have 
a new kind of bank.  It is called too big to fail.  TBTF, and 
it is a wonderful bank.79 
After the financial crisis of the late 2000s, politicians ceased 
touting them.80 
Both local and nationwide banks have failed in the recent 
financial collapse.81  “Some banks fail[ed] without notice.  
Other failing banks capture[d] the attention of policymakers, 
often because of the bank’s large size and significant role in 
the financial system.”82  The large nationwide TBTF banks, 
however, have raised the most alarm among economists, 
world leaders, and the public because of the extent of the 
possible detrimental effects they can have on the economy.83 
TBTF also represents a financial school of thought.  “A 
TBTF regime is a policy environment in which uninsured 
 
 76. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 74, at 547–63. 
 77. STERN & FELDMAN, supra note 2, at 13. 
 78. See id. at 11. 
 79. Id. at 13. 
 80. See Volcker Rules, supra note 16 (statement of Simon Johnson). 
 81. Id. at 45. 
 82. STERN & FELDMAN, supra note 2, at 1. 
 83. Id. at 2. 
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creditors expect the government to protect them from 
prospective losses [and prevent] the failure of a big bank; big 
banks are said to be too big to fail in countries following such 
a regime.”84  Stern and Feldman wrote the TBTF doctrine 
included, “(1) [A] policy of protecting uninsured creditors at 
banks from the losses they might suffer and (2) a definition of 
big bank[s].”85  If TBTF banks—such as Bank of America, J.P. 
Morgan Chase, and Wells Fargo—were allowed to collapse, it 
would affect America’s economy too drastically because of 
their dominance within it.86  When these banks are bailed out 
uninsured creditors, investing more than the FDIC insured 
$250,000,87 are protected by the government.88  The tax-
generated bailout funding89 essentially uses taxpayer money 
as a safety net for banks walking the tightrope of risky, 
leveraged investments.90 
B. Concerns 
“[T]he largest [six] banks in our economy now have total 
assets in excess of [sixty-three] percent GDP [Gross Domestic 
Product]”91 as of September 30, 2010.92  These banks are: 
Bank of America, J.P. Morgan Chase, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, 
Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley.93  These large 
controllers of American assets evolved through a series of 
mergers between Bank of America and Merrill Lynch,94 J.P. 
 
 84. Id. at 13. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See id. at 12–13; infra Part II.B. 
 87. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, http://www.fdic.gov/ (last 
visited Apr. 17, 2012). 
 88. STERN & FELDMAN, supra note 2, at 12. 
 89. See Chan, supra note 62.  
 90. See STERN & FELDMAN, supra note 2, at 11.  Leveraged is defined as 
using borrowed money “to increase potential return on investment.”  Leverage, 
INVESTOPIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/leverage.asp#axzz1pPY18jkJ 
(last visited Apr. 17, 2012). 
 91. Volcker Rules, supra note 16, at 45. 
 92. Id.  
 93. Robert Lenzner, Six Giant Banks Made $51 Billion Last Year; The Other 
980 Lost Money: An Oligopoly of Goldman, BofA, JPMorgan, Morgan Stanley, 
Citi, and Wells Fargo Is Flourishing, FORBES (June 3, 2010, 1:25 PM) 
http://www.forbes.com/2010/06/03/goldman-sachs-citigroup-markets-lenzner-
morgan-stanley.html.  An up-to-date list is located at Top 50 BHCs, FED. FIN. 
INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL: NAT’L INFO. CTR., http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpub 
web/nicweb/top50form.aspx (last updated Mar. 31, 2012). 
 94. Chan, supra note 62. 
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Morgan Chase and Bear Stearns,95 and Wells Fargo and 
Wachovia.96  By “controlling” sixty-three percent of the United 
States’ GDP, these banks are vital to the U.S. economy.97  
Their dominance, conjuring up memories of the past powerful 
American car and steel industries, also brings fears of the 
possible failure which could have dire effects on job 
availability, domestic dollar power, and the strength of the 
dollar abroad.98 
C. Effects Felt During the Financial Crisis of the Late 2000s 
The repercussions of the TBTF banks’ failed risky 
investments have been catastrophic.99  “Revised data will 
likely show more than 8 million net jobs lost since December 
2007, due to more than a decade of reckless risk-taking 
involving large financial institutions.”100  The driving force 
behind the Financial Crisis of the late 2000s was the collapse 
of the housing and credit “bubble” within the United States.101  
This “bubble” inflated to dangerous levels because America’s 
economy was following the economic trend of 
financialization.102  “The financialization of capitalism—the 
shift in gravity of economic activity from production (and even 
from much of the growing service sector) to finance—is thus 
one of the key issues of our time,” commented John Foster, 
Professor of Sociology at the University of Oregon.103  As a 
result of the shift, economic success now primarily depends on 
the financial sector, including commercial and investment 
banks.104 
 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See Volcker Rules, supra note 16, at 45 (statement of Simon Johnson). 
 98. See id. at 45–46. 
 99. See id. 
 100. Id. at 46.  
 101. Ben S. Bernanke, Four Questions about the Financial Crisis, FED. 
RESERVE (Apr. 14, 2009), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/ 
bernanke20090414a.htm. 
 102. John Bellamy Foster, The Financialization of Capitalization, 58 
MONTHLY REVIEW, Apr. 2007, at 1, available at http://www.greeneconomics 
.net/Financialization.pdf; John Bellamy Foster, SOCIOLOGY.UOREGON.EDU, 
http://sociology.uoregon.edu/faculty/foster.php (last visited Apr. 13, 2012). 
 103. Foster, supra note 102, at 1. 
 104. Economic Crisis and Market Upheavals, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2011), 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/credit_crisis/index.
html?offset=0&s=newest. 
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Both types of banks, taking advantage of consequent 
freedoms due to deregulation, undertook unwise risks.105  
Investment banks, not being subject to the same regulations 
as commercial banks, amassed huge amounts of debt while 
still lending to people and corporations.106  They then lacked 
the reserves to cover massive losses resulting from defaulted 
loans.107  The shortage prevented banks from making further 
loans and halted the economy.108 
D. Bailout Money: Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) 
In 2008, the government made the difficult but necessary 
choice to bailout multiple banks, including TBTF banks, in 
order to avoid total financial collapse.109  Secretary of the 
Treasury Henry Paulson presented TARP to the nation 
TARP, the most memorable bank bailout, on September 19, 
2008.110  It allowed the “Department of the Treasury to 
purchase or insure up to $700 billion of troubled assets.”111  
Congress defined troubled assets as: 
(1) Residential or commercial mortgages and any 
securities, obligations, or other instruments that are based 
on or related to such mortgages, that in each case was 
originated or issued on or before March 14, 2008, the 
purchase of which the Secretary determines promotes 
financial market stability; and 
(2) [A]ny other financial instrument that the Secretary, 
after consultation with the Chairman of the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, determines the 
purchase of which is necessary to promote financial 
market stability, but only upon transmittal of such 
determination, in writing, to the appropriate committees 
of Congress.112 
The Treasury infused capital into failing banks by buying 
their assets and bad debt.113  It has bought twenty-five billion 
dollars worth of assets and bad debt of Citigroup, J.P. Morgan 
 
 105. See Volcker Rules, supra note 16, at 46 (statement of Simon Johnson). 
 106. See Economic Crisis and Market Upheavals, supra note 104. 
 107. See id. 
 108. See id. 
 109. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 6, at 1. 
 110. ANDREW ROSS STORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL 446 (2009). 
 111. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 6, at 1. 
 112. Id. 
 113. See id. 
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Chase, and Wells Fargo; fifteen billion dollars of Bank of 
America; and ten billion dollars of Goldman Sachs.114 
E. Viability 
Before analyzing TBTF banks, it is important to 
contemplate their overall feasibility.  Arguments of Simon 
Johnson, the Chief Economist of the International Monetary 
Fund from August 2007 to August 2008, and Edward Kane, 
renowned Professor of Finance at Boston College, debunking 
the theories of advantageous economies of scale displayed by 
TBTF banks, global competitiveness, and efficiency are 
presented.115  An investigation of a bank merger’s effects on a 
loan offering, providing real evidence of the sensibility in 
these bank mergers, concludes this section. 
1. Economies of Scale 
Large banks would be expected to offer economies of 
scale, but there is little supporting evidence of them 
exhibiting this financial advantage.116  Economies of scale is 
defined as “a situation in which a firm can increase its output 
more than proportionally to its total input cost.”117  If a large 
bank follows the economic theory it should be able to more 
efficiently serve (at lower production costs) its consumers as it 
increases its number of services and account holders.  Simon 
Johnson wrote, “There is no evidence for economies of scale in 
banking over $100 billion of total assets.”118  This absence is 
caused by the bank’s assets becoming so large that its 
dealings became unmanageable.  The bank can then no 
longer consider the welfare of its customers.119  
“[U]nprecedented consolidation in the financial sector over 
the previous decade ha[s] led to no significant efficiency 
gains, no economies of scale beyond a low threshold, and no 
 
 114. Id. at 2.  
 115.  Simon Johnson, MIT.EDU, http://mitsloan.mit.edu/faculty/detail.php?in 
_spseqno=198 (last visited Apr. 17, 2012); Edward J. Kane, BC.EDU, 
https://www2.bc.edu/~kaneeb/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2012). 
 116. See Volcker Rules, supra note 16, at 46–47 (statement of Simon 
Johnson). 
 117. EDGAR K. BROWNING & MARK A. ZUPAN, MACROECONOMICS: THEORY & 
APPLICATIONS 220 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 9th ed. 2006). 
 118. Volcker Rules, supra note 16, at 46 (statement of Simon Johnson). 
 119. Id. 
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evident economies of scope.”120 
Edward Kane disclaimed large banks enjoying economies 
of scale: 
Since large banks exhibit constant returns to scale (they 
are no more or less efficient as they grow larger), and we 
know that large banks enjoy a subsidy due to being too big 
to fail, “offsetting diseconomies must exist in the operation 
of large institutions”—that is without the “too big to fail 
subsidy,” large banks would actually be less efficient than 
midsize banks.121 
Large banks increasing in size do not evidence rising 
efficiency,122 rather there must be increasing inefficiencies 
within larger banks offsetting the economies of scale 
efficiencies they should be experiencing.123  Kane finds the 
involution and magnitude of TBTF banks to be culpable for 
the apparent lack of economies of scale.124  The cumbersome 
internal structure of TBTF banks offsets their would-be 
relative efficiency advantage.125 
“[B]ig banks [are able to] provide benefits to the economy 
that cannot be provided by smaller banks.”126  Large banks 
possess a quasi-national system enabling them to provide 
services to account holders spanning the entire country.  
Nationwide Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) exemplify a 
benefit of this system.127  Large banks also have increased 
networks and cash reserves enabling them, in theory, to give 
larger loans.128  These increased offerings to customers 
 
 120. Id. (citing ROGER W. FERGUSON JR. ET AL., INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL 
STABILITY 93–94 (2007)).  “Economies of scope” is defined as “a case where it is 
cheaper for one firm to produce products jointly than it is for separate firms to 
produce the same products independently.”  BROWNING & ZUPAN, supra note 
117, at 229. 
 121. Volcker Rules, supra note 16, at 47 (statement of Simon Johnson) (citing 
Edward J. Kane, Extracting Nontransparent Safety Net Subsidies by 
Strategically Expanding and Contracting a Financial Institution’s Accounting 
Balance Sheet, 36 J. OF FIN. SERVICES RES. 161–68 (2009)).  Diseconomies of 
scale describes the opposite situation where a firm produces less efficiently as 
increases its production.  BROWNING & ZUPAN, supra note 117, at 220.  Large 
banks display diseconomies of scale rather than desired economies of scale. 
 122. Kane, supra note 121, at 162.  
 123. See id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See id.  
 126. Volcker Rules, supra note 16, at 46 (statement of Simon Johnson). 
 127. See id. 
 128. Id.  For a case of a merged and subsequently larger bank offering a 
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evidence big banks “enjoy[ing] [] economies of scale” enabled 
by increased efficiency.129  Regardless, the TBTF banks’ risks 
still outweigh these above-discussed benefits.130  The simple 
adage of “the bigger the bank, the bigger the gains”131 no 
longer holds true. 
2. Global Competition 
Simon Johnson presents the following argument for large 
banks: “global competitiveness of U.S. corporations requires 
American banks to be at least as big as the banks in any 
other country.”132  While partially true, the financial collapse 
was suffered worldwide133 and operating well in a defunct 
system does not alter (or improve) the state of being defunct.  
Other countries, England for example, admitted their 
banking systems demand drastic overhaul.134  The Bank of 
England termed the bailing out of increasingly bigger banks 
as the “doom loop.”135  Andy Haldane, Bank of England’s 
Executive Director for Financial Stability, and Pier Giorgio 
Alessandri, Bank of England Economist,136 argued 
governments’ repeated bank bail outs cripple their stance of 
“never again[,] . . . add[ing] to the cost of future crises.  And 
the larger these costs, the lower the credibility of ‘never again’ 
announcements.  This is a doom loop.” 137 
Large international corporations spanning multiple 
countries do have “global financing needs.”138  However, one 
bank does not exclusively provide all of a Multinational 
 
smaller loan amount post merger than the two prior individual banks, see supra 
Part II.E.4. 
 129. Id.  
 130. See supra Part II.B. 
 131. Volcker Rules, supra note 16, at 46 (statement of Simon Johnson). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See id. at 45.  
 135. Edmund Conway, Bank of England Says Financiers are Fuelling an 
Economic ‘Doom Loop,’ THE TELEGRAPH (Nov. 6, 2009, 11:50 PM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financetopics/financialcrisis/6516579/Bank-
of-England-says-financiers-are-fuelling-an-economic-doom-loop.html. 
 136. Andy Haldane - Executive Director Financial Stability, BANK OF 
ENGLAND, http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/about/Pages/people/biographies/ 
haldane.aspx (last visited Apr. 17, 2012); Piergiorgio Alessandri, BANK OF 
ENGLAND, http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/research/Pages/economists/staff/ 
piergiorgio_alessandri_publications.aspx (last visited Apr. 17, 2012). 
 137. Conway, supra note 135. 
 138. Volcker Rules, supra note 16, at 47 (statement of Simon Johnson). 
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Corporation’s (MNC) services.139  Instead, MNCs rely on 
“syndicates of banks for major offerings of equity or debt.”140  
Most corporations would prefer not to rely on a single bank.141  
They wish to capitalize on each bank’s specializations, as well 
as protect themselves from bank failure.142  Simon Johnson 
wrote, “U.S. corporations already benefit from competition 
between U.S. and foreign banks, which can provide identical 
financial products; there is no reason to believe that the 
global competitiveness of our non-financial sector depends on 
our having the world’s largest banks.”143  That being said, 
U.S. banks must be large enough to compete with the large 
foreign banks to provide this “global competitiveness” for 
corporations. 
3. What Is This Really About?:  Competition v. Efficiency 
Arguments regarding big banks can be boiled down to the 
timeless tug-of-war between competition and efficiency.  
Competition, in theory, protects the buyer by discouraging 
monopolies, enabling sellers to charge higher prices.  
Efficiency, a by-product of bank mergers, spreads fixed costs, 
decreases costs due to competition, and offers greater 
economies of scale, the benefits of which are theoretically 
passed on to the buyer.  Previously, the efficiency 
consideration was heavily favored because larger banks’ 
positive effects were narrowly considered.  Now, current 
economic reality is driving the promotion of competitiveness. 
4. Coca-Cola Enterprises (CCE) Case 
CCE’s experience reveals bank mergers’ potential 
consequences for borrowers.144  CCE held separate credit lines 
with NationsBank and Bank of America.145  The two banks 
decided to combine.146  Following the banks’ merger, CCE 
could only acquire a loan amounting to half of what the pre-
 
 139. Id.  
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. See id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Jathon Sapsford & Paul Sherer, Deals & Deal Makers: Fewer Banks 
Mean Costlier Credit Lines, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2001, at C1. 
 145. Id.  
 146. Id.  
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merger banks had previously offered.147  The amalgamation 
reduced—and with regards to these two banks removed—
CCE’s ability to procure a larger credit line by initiating loan 
relationships with multiple banks.148  CCE was formerly able 
to benefit from the bank competition. 
Depending from whose viewpoint you are looking, CCE’s 
loan outcome is either encouraging or discouraging.  On one 
hand, the banks were able to reduce a risk they possibly 
should not have taken previously.  Banks had the opportunity 
to accurately assess a borrower’s viability instead of muddling 
numbers to extend an ill-advisedly large loan in hopes of 
defeating the competition.  Conversely, the borrower had 
fewer options for procurement of the loan and received a 
reduced loan. 
III. ANALYSIS OF TBTF BANK MERGERS 
A. TBTF Bank Mergers 
During 2008, multiple nationwide TBTF banks merged: 
Bank of America “swallowed” Merrill Lynch, J.P. Morgan 
Chase bought Bear Stearns and joined Washington Mutual, 
and Wells Fargo purchased Wachovia.149  Permitting these 
mergers only augmented the risks posed by TBTF banks as 
their increased size heightened the consequences of 
prospective failure.  An analysis of the TBTF bank mergers 
will help answer the question posed at the beginning of this 
comment—should the government have allowed them to take 
place? 
B. Tools Used in Analysis 
Antitrust law and BMA factors are the analytic tools 
used to evaluate the government sanction of these TBTF 
bank mergers.  Antitrust law protects competition by 
preventing agreements unreasonably restraining trade150 and 
can be used to assess TBTF bank mergers’ legality.  The 
Warren Court in Brown Shoe Company v. United States151 
 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id.  It is important to note a market shift could have contributed to the 
altered credit line offer as well. 
 149. Chan, supra note 62. 
 150. Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006). 
 151. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 294 (1962). 
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explained the test for antitrust analysis: whether the effect of 
the merger may substantially lessen competition in any line 
of commerce in any section of the country.152  Congress later 
codified this test in section 7 of the Clayton Act.153  In United 
States v. Philadelphia National Bank the same Warren Court 
applied antitrust laws to bank mergers.154 
A bank merger is judged by BMA factors in order to 
assess its possible anticompetitive nature.  Its authorization 
turns on the result of that analysis.155  The factors of 
monopolization,156 anticompetitiveness,157 and traditional 
banking factors are weighed by the court.158  Applying these 
factors to TBTF bank mergers will determine whether they 
violated the BMA and if they discourage competition.159 
C. Analysis 
An analysis of whether these TBTF bank mergers violate 
antitrust laws begins with first determining whether 
antitrust laws apply to the banks or if the banks are shielded 
by antitrust immunity.  If antitrust laws do apply, it is 
essential to determine the relevant market for banks, 
including both their product and geographic markets.  
Ultimately, BMA factors are employed to evaluate the 
mergers’ potential anticompetitive nature. 
1. Do Banks Have Implied Antitrust Immunity for 
Merger Analysis? 
i. Philadelphia National Bank Court Says No 
United States v. Philadelphia National Bank is the 
hallmark case involving bank mergers.160  The Court ruled 
against a merger of two banks, Philadelphia National Bank 
and Girard Trust Corn Exchange, because the merger would 
discourage competition, violating section 7 of the Clayton 
 
 152. Id. at 328; 15 U.S.C. § 12(a) (2011); United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 
374 U.S. 321, 356 (1963). 
 153. See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006). 
 154. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 338–43. 
 155. Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 316–23. 
 156. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5)(A) (2006); see supra Part I.D.3. 
 157. § 1828(c)(5)(B); see supra Part I.D.3. 
 158. § 1828(c)(5)(B); see supra Part I.D.3. 
 159. See infra Part III.C.3. 
 160. United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 321 (1963). 
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Act.161  The banks claimed section 7 relief because of 
burdensome government banking regulation.162  But the 
Court held government regulation did not grant them 
immunization.163 
ii. Antitrust Savings Clause 
The BHCA contains an antitrust savings clause—
“[N]othing in this Act shall exempt any [BHC] involved in 
such a transaction from complying with the antitrust laws 
after the consummation of such transaction.”164  This further 
confirms the application of antitrust laws to bank mergers.  
This same reasoning is applied to the antitrust savings clause 
in the telecommunications industry. 
Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. 
Trinko, LLP is the seminal telecommunications case 
regarding the implementation of the antitrust savings 
clause.165  The Rehnquist Court held industry regulation did 
not bar application of antitrust laws.166  An antitrust savings 
clause within the applicable 1996 Telecommunications Act 
preserved application.167  The savings clause was as follows: 
“Nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act 
shall be construed to modify, impair, or supersede the 
applicability of any of the antitrust laws.”168 
The prior stated BHCA antitrust savings clause 
expressed similar language and intent.169  The BHCA 
required bank mergers to comply with antitrust laws in 
addition to its guidelines.170  Refusal of antitrust immunity 
was in accordance with Federal Reserve Chairman at the 
time William Martin’s belief that the Attorney General, the 
government body that enforces antitrust provisions, should 
retain full authority under the Clayton Act.171  Martin 
 
 161. Id. at 371–72. 
 162. Id. at 368. 
 163. Id. at 350, 354. 
 164. 12 U.S.C. § 1849(b) (2006). 
 165. Verizon Commc’n Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 
398, 398 (2004). 
 166. Id.  
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 406. 
 169. § 1849(b). 
 170. See id.  
 171. See Current Antitrust Problems: Hearing Before the Antitrust Subcomm. 
(Subcomm. No. 5) of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong. 2173 (1955) 
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granted government permission to analyze bank mergers 
according to BMA factors.172 
2.  The Relevant Market 
Defining the relevant market is the first stage in 
antitrust analysis.173  The relevant market is defined as “a 
product or group of products and a geographic area in which 
[two or more businesses’ products are] produced or sold.”174  It 
can be broken down into the product and the geographic 
market.175  Designating the product market determines 
substitutability between the companies’ goods.176  The court 
decides the product market by assessing the potential change 
in a consumer’s purchasing habits in reaction to “a small but 
significant and non-transitory increase in price.”177  As 
mentioned supra, the geographic market comprises the area 
in which the businesses produce or sell their products.178 
The present relevant market is composed of the TBTF 
banks’ product and geographic markets.  Their product 
market must now include loans and investments made by 
both commercial and investment banks.  TBTF banks would 
argue the geographic market should be worldwide because of 
their international clientele.  This international market 
would suggest the banks are competing internationally and 
hence lessen the impact of a merger’s anticompetitive effects.  
A narrower, national market is more precise.  While acting in 
their commercial banking capacity American TBTF banks 
serve primarily domestic customers.  The BMA analysis 
conducted below will assume a national market. 
 
 
(statement of William Martin, Federal Reserve Board Chairman). 
 172. Id. at 2170. 
 173. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 404 
(1956). 
 174. AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, BANK MERGERS AND 
ACQUISITIONS HANDBOOK 113 (2006); DEPT. OF JUSTICE AND FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 4 (1992, rev. 1997), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.pdf. 
 175. AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 174, at 113. 
 176. See DEPT. OF JUSTICE AND FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES 7–8 (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/ 
guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf. 
 177. Id. at 9. 
 178. AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 174, at 113. 
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3. BMA Factors 
i. Monopolization 
There is no American banking monopoly,179 nor is there 
an oligopoly,180 as there are still numerous distinctly owned 
banks in the United States.  Though an attempt to 
monopolize the banking industry is conceivable in the near 
future as large banks grow increasingly stronger, making it 
ever more difficult for smaller banks to compete.  
“Undersized” banks cannot contend with expanding TBTF 
banks because the larger banks offer credit card deals, 
national ATMs, and loans the smaller banks cannot 
provide.181  At present, however, there is no monopolization 
created by TBTF bank mergers. 
ii. Anticompetitiveness 
Mergers creating large national banks generate anti-
competitiveness.  They lessen the number of competing banks 
in the United States.  Further, large banks are evolving into 
national banks and only other like-sized institutions can truly 
contend.  These national banks presently vie for customers, 
but diminished rivalry will result as TBTF banks’ continue 
their amalgamation.  The merged institutions have created a 
highly concentrated American bank market, fostering 
unhealthy competition.  “The big four [banks] have half of the 
market for mortgages and two-thirds of the market for credit 
cards.  Five banks have over [ninety-five] percent of the 
market for over-the-counter derivatives.  Three U.S. banks 
have over [forty] percent of the global market for stock 
underwriting.”182  The market power of TBTF banks, in the 
words of Simon Johnson, is “dangerous.”183 
Several arguments support the creation of large banks.  
Arguably, the increased market power allows TBTF banks to 
accomplish more because they spend less resources, time and 
money, competing.  The increased productivity of these banks 
 
 179. A monopoly would involve a single bank meeting all of the country’s 
banking needs.  See BROWNING & ZUPAN, supra note 117, at 312.  
 180. A bank oligopoly would involve a few banks providing all of the banking 
services for the entire nation.  See id. at 375.  
 181. See sources cited supra notes 126–29; supra Part II.E.1.  
 182. Volcker Rules, supra note 16, at 46 (statement of Simon Johnson). 
 183. Id. at 45.  
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benefits the whole country because these are American 
banks.184  Randall Kroszner, Professor of Economics at the 
University of Chicago’s Booth School of Business,185 stated,  
Branching deregulation tends to reduce banks’ local 
market power and improves conditions for borrowers.  
Although not without controversy, a number of studies 
have shown that lending to small businesses increases on 
average when banking organizations purchase small 
banks, and credit availability to small businesses 
increases in the years following banking organizations’ 
takeover of small banks.186 
However, large bank mergers also have negative effects on 
customers.  Some of these negative effects are explored below. 
 Bank mergers enable the unified entities to raise loan 
rates because of less inter-bank competition for customers.187  
The resulting decreased loan amount in the CCE Case, 
discussed supra, illustrates another possible negative effect of 
these unions.188  “Bank mergers lead to higher interest rates 
and diminished economic conditions.”189  Increased prices for 
bank customers and reduced competition between banks 
worsen economic conditions.  People become less likely to 
procure bank loans and then reinvest that money into the 
economy by starting new businesses or buying products. 
“[H]igher real estate loan rates [are] associated with 
bank mergers”190 and “bank mergers influence deposit rates to 
the detriment of depositors.”191  As a result of decreased 
competition, banks face a reduced risk of losing customers as 
a consequence of increasing their real estate loan rates.192  
Bank mergers result in diminished bank “operating 
efficiency”193 evidencing a lack of economies of scope.  Banks 
display economies of scope when they can provide services 
 
 184. See id. at 46–47. 
 185. Randall S. Kroszner, CHICAGOBOOTH.EDU, http://www.chicagobooth 
.edu/faculty/bio.aspx?person_id=12825212928 (last visited Nov. 23, 2011). 
 186. Kroszner, supra note 34, at 38.  
 187. Donald R. Fraser et al., Market Power, Bank Megamergers, and the 
Welfare of Bank Borrowers, 34 J. FIN. RES. 641, 646 (2011). 
 188. See Part II.E.4.  
 189. Fraser et al., supra note 187, at 646. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 647.  
 192. See id. at 646–47. 
 193. Id. at 647. 
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more efficiently (at less cost) “jointly” than separately.194  
Actually diseconomies of scope195 are revealed, “lead[ing] to 
higher loan rates and/or lower deposit rates.”196  Convincing 
evidence exists pointing to TBTF bank mergers discouraging 
competition. 
iii. Traditional Banking Factors 
The BMA considers “the financial and managerial 
resources and the future prospects of the existing and 
proposed institutions and the convenience and needs of the 
community to be served.”197  These traditional banking factors 
are indispensable to the analysis of TBTF banks.  Banks 
investing in risky markets and then receiving government 
bailouts when they fail do not benefit the community for two 
reasons.  First, taxpayers bear the burden of expensing that 
bailout.  Second, a very real incentive pressuring these banks 
to make safer investments is eliminated.  TBTF banks may 
lose customers due to unwise investments, but they do not 
face a bona fide threat of failure.  Moral hazard—“[t]he 
tendency to incur risks that one is protected against”—is 
bred.198  Bank bailouts have in effect removed an extremely 
effective incentive for banks to make safer investments.199  
TBTF banks pose an indisputable threat to the United States 
economy and to the interests of the American people.  
Furthermore, they lack a legitimate incentive to lessen that 
threat. 
4. Final Analysis 
There is no current monopolization created by the TBTF 
bank mergers; however, there is compelling evidence they 
discourage competition.  Applying the TBTF bank mergers to 
the traditional banking factors illuminates that they are not 
serving the community’s—that is the United States’—
 
 194. See BROWNING & ZUPAN, supra note 117, at 229. 
 195. Banks experience diseconomies of scope when separate banks can 
provide services more efficiently (at less cost) separately than “jointly.”  See id.  
 196. Fraser et al., supra note 187, at 647. 
 197. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5) (2006); see supra Part I.D.3. 
 198.  ALAN C. SHAPIRO & ATULYA SARIN, FOUNDATIONS OF MULTINATIONAL 
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 527 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 6th ed. 2009).   
 199.  “Capitalism without failure is like religion without sin.  It doesn’t work.  
Bankruptcies and losses concentrate the mind on prudent behavior.”  Id. at 68 
n.1 (quoting economist Allan H. Meltzer). 
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interests.  Their potential failure greatly encumbers the 
public in the form of taxes for bailout money and detrimental 
effects on the economy.  TBTF bank mergers violate the BMA 
and should not have been allowed. 
IV. PROPOSED CHANGES 
Because these bank mergers violated antitrust laws, 
stark changes must be made to their product, the TBTF 
banks.  This revamping could be achieved through the 
enforcement of an additional BMA traditional banking factor.  
Currently the traditional banking factors do not expressly 
account for future ramifications.  Foreseeing future adverse 
effects, such as the dire economic effects, manifest clearly 
that the “needs of the community” are not best served by 
TBTF bank mergers.  Further, TBTF banks must be divided 
to create smaller and hence more manageable banks. 
The “needs of the community” factor can be utilized to 
determine a reasonable and enforceable bank size restriction.  
In the interests of the community, the government must 
create and implement this cap size.  Determination of an 
appropriate cap size is a complex issue beyond this 
Comment’s breadth, but a system of regional banks, 
apportioned by time zone, would be a sensible start.  This 
crucial restriction will limit bank size and increase 
competition in an effort to save the American economy from 
future disasters.  “Without a size cap on individual bank size, 
[the United States] will move towards the highly dangerous 
situation that prevails in some parts of Western Europe—
where individual banks hold assets worth more (at least on 
paper, during a boom) than their home country’s GDP.”200  
This is valid cause for worry because this power gives banks 
the ability to take immense, perilous risks.201  These 
institutions’ growth must be confined, particularly 
considering the government and, ultimately, taxpayers fund 
their risk and potential failure. 
The GLBA needs to be retracted, and the GSA should be 
reinstated.  Separating commercial banks from investment 
banks would be both physically and legally prudent.  It will 
advance their regulation by constructing more transparent 
 
 200. Volcker Rules, supra note 16, at 45 (statement of Simon Johnson). 
 201. See id. at 45–46. 
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and effective distinct controlling statutes.  An absolute 
separation may be untenable, given the current global 
marketplace demands, but efforts must be made to 
distinguish two banks serving contradictory needs and 
requiring divergent laws. 
The RNIA must be expanded considering the evolution of 
“wholesale financing.”  Precise enlargement will predicate 
upon GSA reinstatement that will, as stated above, 
disentangle commercial banks from investment banks.  
Currently, the RNIA’s ten percent deposit holding 
requirement is inept at controlling TBTF banks in their 
current construct.  The improved restriction must encompass 
money TBTF banks receive from wholesale financing. 
CONCLUSION 
Mergers creating TBTF banks violate the BMA.  They are 
anticompetitive and clearly not in the community’s best 
interests.202  TBTF banks, through deregulation, have grown 
beyond what the United States’ economy can safely sustain.203  
Curtailing bank cap size is paramount to creating a more 
manageable bank.204  The Legislature must revert to stricter 
banking statutes.  To not do so would evidence, borrowing 
language from the Roberts Court, “systemic negligence”205 on 
the government’s part.  The Great Recession elucidated the 
TBTF dilemma, and the Legislature’s failure to take 
corrective and preventive action would be “grossly negligent 
conduct”206 considering another economic collapse could only 
be described as “circumstances recurring.”207 
Increased regulation and restriction will help revive the 
public’s trust in its government and banking system.  With 
the rise of globalization and increasing foreign competition,208 
strengthened confidence in America’s political and economic 
structure will be of the utmost importance.  Improved 
banking regulation is a step towards stabilizing the future of 
America’s economy and avoiding future financial collapse. 
 
 202. See supra Part III.C.4. 
 203. See supra Part II.B. 
 204. See supra Part IV. 
 205. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009). 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. SHAPIRO & SARIN, supra note 198, at 4.  
